175 personnel killed in 10 years: why Bastar still remains a Maoist stronghold

Since the 2010 Chintalnar massacre, the Dantewada-Sukma-Bijapur axis has claimed the lives of more than 175 security forces personnel, besides many civilians. While 76 CRPF personnel were killed in the Chintalnar encounter, On Saturday, 22 security personnel were killed in the latest encounter in Bijapur. A look at the Maoist violence figures in Chhattisgarh shows that most of the attacks and casualties occurred between March and July. Sources say this is because usually the CPI (Maoist) begins its strategic counter-offensive between the end of February and June. The campaign includes an aggressive military campaign against security forces before the monsoon – which makes the region difficult.

It is a matter of concern that despite the campaign against left-wing extremists which started about 15 years ago, the security forces are still fighting in this area known as Bastar. A host of factors – remoteness, jungle terrain, The absence of administration and lack of political will – has been blamed for the slow progress there. Sources in the security establishment say that the abolition of the movement in the neighboring states of Andhra Pradesh and Odisha has fueled the concentration of cadres and leaders in the Bastar region – providing easy agitation for rebels across borders due to proximity to other states . Most, however, point to the absence of roads, communication and proper administration as the main reason for the Maoists to continue the area. Some point to the Chhattisgarh Police, which for years was “reluctant” to lead in the figh

t. “Take any state where this problem has subsided, be it Andhra Pradesh, Telangana or West Bengal, it has happened because the state government and the state police have given it ownership through and through their problem. In West Bengal, Most of the information was generated by the local police and provided to the central forces which then operated with the state police. In Jharkhand too, the kind of support provided by the local police is unprecedented. Despite very difficult terrain, you get a lot of success there. He also said that Chhattisgarh was easier than other states, region-wise. The main problem pointed out by many people is that the road network in the core Maoist area of ​​Chhattisgarh is almost “non-existent

“. “Even hotbeds in Bihar and Jharkhand have a better road network. The communication network is also better, “A serving CRPF officer said. Another former CRPF Director General felt that the Salwa-Judum militia campaign was upside down. “It divided the villages into camps. They began living in camps, pushing those parts of the campaign into Maoist arms with the security forces. “Some sources also referred to the District Reserve Guard, the CRPF who helped train and lift. He said, “The idea was that DRG would take the lead and CRPF would play a supporting role. But CRPF has remained the place till date in Chhattisgarh, ”an official said, adding that the improvement in local police participation was not satisfactory.

A CRPF official said that the political will of the state is the most important. In Andhra and Telangana, at the peak of the problem, The government had created a Remote and Internal Area Development Authority. It will coordinate all government schemes for the development of these areas in a coherent manner. “Even in West Bengal, hospitals and bridges were built in Maoist areas, local people were given jobs. This is partly due to the formation of Bastaria Battalion in Chhattisgarh. But the infrastructure for marketing roads, schools, hospitals and forest produce needs to come into Chhattisgarh Maoist areas, ”the official said. “The day the administration reaches these areas, the LWE problem will be resolved within three years.” Sources said that operations in Chhattisgarh are also more complex as the contingent of security forces is larger than in other states.

“Of late, joint operations have increased and local police have become more active in Chhattisgarh, but given the large number of forces in the state, The forces are required to conduct joint exercises continuously. Otherwise, there will be confusion of command at a critical time, loss of coordination and casualties

. Even important administrations reaching remote areas have been recognized by the Ministry of Home Affairs in a document on LWE violence. “Over the years, the Maoists have managed to penetrate remote and inaccessible tribal pockets in some states. In contrast, state institutions of governance also gradually moved away from such areas, resulting in zero security and development. This suits the Maoists, who have established some kind of rudimentary parallel system of administration in these areas.

. There will be harm to the coordination and there will be casualties. Even important administrations reaching remote areas have been recognized by the Ministry of Home Affairs in a document on LWE violence. “Over the years, the Maoists have managed to penetrate remote and inaccessible tribal pockets in some states. In contrast, state institutions of governance also gradually moved away from such areas, resulting in zero security and development. This suits the Maoists, who have established some kind of rudimentary parallel system of administration in these areas. . There will be harm to the coordination and there will be casualties. Even important administrations reaching remote areas have been recognized by the Ministry of Home Affairs in a document on LWE violence

. “Over the years, the Maoists have managed to penetrate remote and inaccessible tribal pockets in some states. In contrast, state institutions of governance also gradually moved away from such areas, resulting in zero security and development. This suits the Maoists, who have established some kind of rudimentary parallel system of administration in these areas. . Who have established some kind of rudimentary parallel system of administration in these areas. . Who have established some kind of rudimentary parallel system of administration in these areas. .